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COLLECTIVE RIGHTS TO INDIGENOUS 
LAND IN CARCIERI v. SALAZAR 
Melanie Riccobene Jarboe* 
Abstract: Since settlers set foot in the Americas, tension has existed be-
tween American Indian tribes and European settlers over tribal rights to 
land. When the Narragansett Tribe of Rhode Island proposed to build 
low-income housing on a thirty-one acre parcel of land, it became in-
volved in years of litigation with the State of Rhode Island, its governor, 
and the town of Charlestown, RI. Throughout the litigation, the debate 
over collective ownership of land, cultural differences in property rights 
and the intentions behind the United States government’s policy posi-
tions regarding American Indians simmered below the surface. This 
comment focuses on those issues and argues that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Carcieri v. Salazar, by refusing to grant collective rights to the 
Narragansett Tribe, violates the Indian Reorganization Act and consti-
tutes an unjust imposition of the western view of individual rights to tribal 
land ownership. 
Introduction 
 All over the world, indigenous peoples struggle to maintain or re-
claim their ancestral lands from governments, private citizens, or cor-
porations.1 In 2005, a group of scholars and professionals assembled at 
Oxford University to discuss the cultural, social, political and legal di-
mensions of land rights among indigenous peoples around the world.2 
                                                                                                                      
* Staff Writer, Boston College Third World Law Journal (2009–2010). 
1 See, e.g., Frank Brennan, Standing in Deep Time; Standing in the Law: A Non-Indigenous 
Australian Perspective on Land Rights, Land Wrongs, and Self-Determination, in Land Rights: 
Oxford Amnesty Lectures 77, 90 [hereinafter “Land Rights”] (Timothy Chesters ed., 
2009) (discussing the Gurindji in Australia); Ken Wiwa, If This Is Your Land, Where Are Your 
Stories?, in Land Rights, supra, at 124, 137–44 (discussing the Ogoni in Nigeria). 
2 See Timothy Chesters, Introduction to Land Rights, supra note 1, at 1, 1. Indigenous 
peoples are descended from the pre-colonial inhabitants of particular territories, are often 
marginalized in society, have distinct traditions, identities, customs and beliefs, and define 
themselves as indigenous. See Lotte Hughes, Response to Richard Leakey, “Whose World Is It 
Anyway?,” in Land Rights, supra note 1, at 166, 169–71. The idea of indigenousness is, in 
large part, the invention of colonial anthropologists, whose definitions made it easier for 
colonial governments to classify, control, divide, and rule native peoples. See id. at 171. 
Despite that fact, the definition helps those who seek rights and protections for indigenous 
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Five of the presented speeches and six essays in response make up Land 
Rights: Oxford Amnesty Lectures.3 Although each presenter and respon-
dent discussed land rights in a different country and evidenced a dif-
ferent perspective, a few core themes run throughout the lectures and 
throughout the international debate on indigenous rights.4 One theme 
in particular, the tension between individual and collective rights to 
land among indigenous peoples, resurfaced again and again.5 
 In the United States, Congress has used its plenary power over In-
dian affairs to enact laws that limit or eradicate tribal land rights, mak-
ing the tribes ever-more dependent on the U.S. government for aid.6 
Meaningful judicial review of Congressional acts has not been forth-
coming, and the Supreme Court has set many harmful precedents it-
                                                                                                                      
peoples across the globe. See Robert T. Coulter, The U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indige-
nous Peoples: A Historic Change in International Law, 45 Idaho L. Rev. 539, 543 (2009). 
3 Chesters, supra note 2, at 1. 
4 See id. at 11. 
5 See William Beinart, Stategies of the Poor and Some Problems of Land Reform in the Eastern 
Cape, South Africa: An Argument Against Recommunalization, in Land Rights, supra note 1, at 
177, 200 (suggesting that land reform policies should exclude communal forms of owner-
ship); Brennan, supra note 1, at 77, 78–80 (noting that with collective land rights and self-
determination, indigenous people must reconcile their membership in society at large 
with membership in the collective, and must understand the clash that occurs when an 
individual asserts rights against the collective); Richard Leakey, Whose World Is It Anyway?, 
in Land Rights, supra note 1, at 153, 156–57 (discussing the tension between European 
and indigenous concepts of land rights); Romeo Saganash, Indigenous Peoples and Human 
Rights, in Land Rights, supra note 1, at 47, 56, 60–61 (discussing the tension between 
individual and collective rights while urging the recognition of collective rights to land); 
see also James Anaya, Indigenous Law and Its Contribution to Global Pluralism, 6 Indigenous 
L.J. 3, 6–7 (2007); Lorie M. Graham, Reparations, Self-Determination, and the Seventh Genera-
tion, 21 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 47, 63–64 (2008); Austen L. Parrish, Changing Territoriality, 
Fading Sovereignty, and the Development of Indigenous Rights, 31 Am. Indian L. Rev. 291, 309 
(2006–2007). 
6 See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383–84 (1886). Congress bases this author-
ity on its power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several 
States, and with the Indian Tribes . . . .” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Congress formerly 
claimed power under the Treaty Clause, but after abolishing treaty-making powers with 
Indian tribes in 1871, Congress relied entirely on the Commerce Clause. See Steven L. 
Pevar, The Rights of Indians and Tribes: The Authoritative ACLU Guide to Indian 
and Tribal Rights 58 (3rd ed., S. Ill. Univ. Press 2002) (1983). In several instances, Con-
gressional legislation made tribes more dependent on the federal government and/or 
removed benefits from tribes. See Indian General Allotment (Dawes) Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 
388 (1886) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331–334, 339, 341, 342, 348, 349, 354, 
381 (2006)); Act of July 27, 1866, ch. 278, 14 Stat. 292 (“The United States shall extin-
guish, as rapidly as may be consistent with public policy and the welfare of the Indians, and 
only by their voluntary cession, the Indian title to all lands falling under the operation of 
this act and acquired in the donation to the road named in the act.”); Act of May 29, 1830, 
ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (“To provide for an exchange of lands with the Indians residing in any 
of the states or territories, and for their removal west of the river Mississippi.”). 
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self, often withdrawing federal benefits that tribes need most and leav-
ing few resources behind.7 In Carcieri v. Salazar, the Supreme Court de-
nied the Narragansett Tribe of Rhode Island (“the Tribe” or “the Nar-
ragansett”), and any tribe not under federal jurisdiction in 1934, the 
benefits of The Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), which Congress 
passed during the New Deal era.8 The IRA, which came after centuries 
of whittling away tribal rights and preceded many more years of the 
same, is a rare bright spot in the history of federal Indian law.9 Never-
theless, the majority in Carcieri held that the definition of “tribe” in the 
IRA was dependent on the definition of “Indian,” therefore denying 
that a tribe had any collective rights that transcended the individual 
                                                                                                                      
7 See, e.g., Carcieri v. Salazar (Carcieri III ), 129 S. Ct. 1058, 1068 (2009) (holding that 
the Narragansett Tribe of Rhode Island could not claim benefits under the Indian Reor-
ganization Act of 1934 because they were not under federal jurisdiction in 1934); Brendale 
v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 425 (1989) 
(holding that Indian tribes cannot regulate land held in fee by non-Indians); Lyng v. Nw. 
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 451, 453 (1988) (holding that, despite the 
“devastating” impact on traditional religious practices that a Forest Service logging road 
through sacred Native American land would have, “[w]hatever rights the Indians may have 
to the use of the area . . . do not divest the Government of its right to use what is, after all, 
its land”); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 205–06, 212 (1978) (holding 
that Indian tribes do not have inherent jurisdiction to try and to punish non-Indians, re-
ducing tribes’ ability to enforce the norms of their community against non-Indians who 
commit crimes on reservations and, especially, against corporations); Lone Wolf v. Hitch-
cock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903) (holding that Congress has the power to abrogate Indian 
treaties in favor of “considerations of governmental policy”); Kagama, 118 U.S. at 384 
(“The power of the General Government over these remnants of a race once powerful, 
now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the 
safety of those among whom they dwell.”); Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 
574 (1823) (holding that tribes have the right of possession and use of land, which could 
be extinguished at any time by the federal government through discovery). For a general 
discussion of Congressional plenary power over Indian affairs and the lack of meaningful 
judicial review, see Robert J. Miller, Native America, Discovered and Conquered 
163–64 (2006); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court’s Indian Problem, 59 Hastings L.J. 
579, 580–81 (2007) (arguing the existence of a “reduction in Indian law cases decided on 
the basis of established precedent, an increase in cases decided without a guiding legal 
theory, and an increase in cases that appear to be decided on the basis of the gut reaction 
of the Justices”). 
8 See Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–479 (2006); Carcieri III, 129 S. 
Ct. at 1068. For a discussion of the policy underpinnings of the IRA, see Pevar, supra note 
6, at 10. 
9 See Ward Churchill, Perversions of Justice: Indigenous Peoples and An-
gloamerican Law 16 (2003); Pevar, supra note 6, at 10. Although the IRA affords signifi-
cant benefits to tribes, the Act also further increases tribal dependence on the federal 
government and, in some ways, decreases sovereignty. See Churchill, supra. Despite these 
caveats, it is still appropriate to characterize the IRA as more positive than other legisla-
tion, such as the Dawes Act. See Larry W. Burt, Tribalism in Crisis: Federal Indian 
Policy, 1953–1961, at 3 (1982). 
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rights of its members.10 By limiting the ability of tribes to assert collec-
tive rights and to exercise sovereignty over their land under the IRA, 
the Supreme Court removed some of the most important federal bene-
fits that tribes may claim.11 
 Part I of this Comment introduces the tension between individual 
and collective rights and the United Nation’s resolution of this tension. 
Part II traces the evolution of American legislative and judicial policy as 
it pertains to American Indians.12 Part III addresses Carcieri v. Salazar as 
an example of the Court’s refusal to recognize collective rights to land 
under the IRA. Finally, Part IV discusses the proposed Congressional 
action to reverse the holding in Carcieri by amending the IRA to extend 
benefits to any federally recognized tribe. Part IV urges the Court to 
use the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as a template 
to recognize collective rights without endangering individual rights. 
I. The Debate over Collective Rights for Indigenous Peoples 
 As the debate over collective rights for indigenous peoples has un-
folded, multiple perspectives have emerged.13 Some scholars believe 
that collective rights for indigenous peoples are tantamount to human 
rights and should be protected at the international level.14 In this view, 
indigenous peoples should have the ability to assert collective rights 
against those who attempt to undermine their beliefs, cultures and tra-
ditions.15 Although many nations are prepared to recognize the individ-
ual rights of indigenous people to own property, to be free from dis-
crimination, and so forth, very few countries recognize the collective 
rights of groups to the same.16 Nevertheless, “To restrict international 
                                                                                                                      
10 See Carcieri III, 129 S. Ct. at 1067. 
11 See id.; Pevar, supra note 6, at 89–90 (discussing the positive effects of the IRA on 
tribal abilities to control land among other benefits such as the ability to collect taxes, 
borrow money, enter into buisiness contracts and operate federally funded programs). 
12 American Indian is the current census term used by the federal government. Alex 
M. Johnson, The Re-emergence of Race as a Biological Category: The Societal Implications—
Reaffirmation of Race, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 1547, 1558 n.42 (2009). 
13 See Chesters, supra note 2, at 1–11. 
14 See Marcus Colchester, Response to Frank Brennan, Standing Deep in Time; Standing in 
the Law: A Non-Indigenous Australian Perspective on Land Rights, Land Wrongs, and Self-
Determination, in Land Rights, supra note 1, at 117, 122–23; Saganash, supra note 5, at 61. 
15 See Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, Annex 22, 
U.N. Doc. A/Res/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007); Saganash, supra note 5, at 52–57. 
16 See, e.g., Colchester, supra note 14, at 121 (“[The UK does] not accept the concept of 
collective human rights . . . . [H]uman rights are calls upon states to treat individuals in 
accordance with international standards. As a result, the UK is unwilling to accept use of 
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human rights to individual rights would only serve to assimilate or oth-
erwise undermine [indigenous] cultures, traditions, legal systems, and 
world views.”17 For those who hold this view, recognizing only individual 
rights leaves indigenous peoples without any effective means of self-
preservation and practically ensures extinction.18 
 Others believe that recognizing collective rights will endanger the 
individual rights of indigenous persons.19 In this view, the danger in rec-
ognizing collective rights is that individual rights (for women and chil-
dren or for minorities within the collective, for example) will suffer under 
collective leadership and the State’s ability to protect those individuals’ 
rights will diminish.20 Still others believe that indigenous peoples should 
not seek recognition from the international community, preferring that 
they organize to change their circumstances inside their own countries.21 
Proponents of this view argue that indigenous claims to collective rights 
“are often seen as threats to the unity of the . . . nation, instead of oppor-
tunities to make all groups feel included and to ensure that their needs 
are recognized.”22 Although protection of individual rights is of para-
mount importance both internationally and domestically, one has to 
question the unilateral denial of collective rights on this basis.23 
 The debate over the collective rights of indigenous people has 
been especially fierce where land rights are concerned.24 For many in-
                                                                                                                      
the term rights of indigenous peoples in a human rights context.” (quoting Foreign & Com-
monwealth Office, Human Rights, Annual Report of 2004, Cm. 6364, at 212)). 
17 Saganash, supra note 5, at 61. 
18 See id. 
19 See Brennan, supra note 1, at 80; Colchester, supra note 14, at 121. 
20 See, e.g., Seyla Benhabib, The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in 
the Global Era 59 (2002); Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 194 (1978); 
Ayelet Shachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and Women’s 
Rights 2 (2001). But see S. James Anaya, Superpower Attitudes Towards Indigenous Peoples and 
Group Rights, 93 Am. Soc’y. Int’l L. Proc. 251, 257 (1999) (calling the United States op-
position to collective rights the result of a lingering Cold War distrust of group rights and 
asserting that the potential conflict between individual and group rights is a “nonissue”); 
Dwight G. Newman, Theorizing Collective Indigenous Rights, 31 Am. Indian L. Rev. 273, 279 
(2006–2007) (stating that Anaya’s argument that collective rights are a “nonissue” will not 
be persuasive to those with concerns about individual rights). 
21 See Leakey, supra note 5, at 162 (“If you haven’t got your rights in Kenya, if you want 
to change your members of parliament, if you want to change the Kenyan constitution, 
these are not questions for the international community. This is not a problem that you 
can address in the capitals of North and South.”). 
22 Maurice Odhiambo Makoloo, Kenya: Minorities, Indigenous Peoples and 
Ethnic Diversity 2 (2005). 
23 See Anaya, supra note 20, at 257; Hughes, supra note 2, at 176. 
24 See Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 15, at Annex, art. 
26; Wiwa, supra note 1, at 124. 
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digenous communities the right to occupy their ancestral lands is a 
precondition to survival as a people.25 Though indigenous peoples 
have, by definition, inhabited their lands for many years, remaining on 
the land and defending or regaining that land from colonizing forces 
has proven difficult, especially when colonizing forces assert the belief 
that land ownership is not about connection to the land, but rather 
about “owning” or using the land in accordance with colonial beliefs.26 
 The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (“the Decla-
ration”), passed by the United Nations General Assembly on September 
13, 2007, champions the collective rights of indigenous peoples.27 Al-
though the Declaration extends collective rights to indigenous groups, it 
also includes provisions that protect women, elders, children and mi-
norities within indigenous communities.28 These provisions encourage 
States to aid indigenous peoples in educating, protecting, and promot-
ing the development of all members, both as individuals and as mem-
bers of the collective.29 Multiple provisions in the Declaration relate spe-
cifically to land use and recognize that many of the injustices 
perpetrated against indigenous peoples worldwide have involved land.30 
The Declaration recognizes the right of indigenous people to exercise 
or regain control over their ancestral lands, to develop their lands in 
accordance with their own priorities and according to their own strate-
                                                                                                                      
25 See Brennan, supra note 1, at 90 (discussing the Gurindji people’s reclamation of 
their traditional lands in the Watti Creek (“Dagaragu”) in Australia); Wiwa, supra note 1, at 
137–44 (discussing the Ogoni’s struggle for rights to their ancestral land in the Niger River 
Delta, which has been exploited by oil companies to the detriment of the Ogoni since 
1958). 
26 Daniel K. Richter, Facing East from Indian Country 54 (2001). European 
claims of sovereignty over indigenous peoples were grounded in the legal fiction of terra 
nullius, the principle that sovereignty could be acquired over unoccupied territory by dis-
covery, and the belief that land occupied by indigenous peoples was not occupied in a 
legal sense. Patrick Macklem, Indigenous Recognition in International Law: Theoretical Observa-
tions, 30 Mich. J. Int’l L. 177, 184 (2008). Early American colonists also participated in 
land acquisition by discovery, which the Supreme Court sanctioned in Johnson v. M’Intosh. 
See 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573 (1823). 
27 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 15. The final vote was 
143 nations in favor of the Declaration, 11 nations abstaining and 4 nations opposed (the 
United States, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia). Press Release, United Nations, 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. A/RES61/295 
(Sept. 13, 2007). The Declaration represents a fundamental sea-change in the interna-
tional community’s view on indigenous peoples. See Coulter, supra note 2, at 545 (discuss-
ing the lengthy process of drafting the Declaration and gaining approval). 
28 See Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 15, at arts. 14–15, 
17, 21–22, 33, 44. 
29 See id. 
30 See id. at Annex, arts. 8(2)(b), 10, 25–26, 28–30, 32. 
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gies, and provides redress if such rights are not recognized.31 The Decla-
ration also includes the right to restitution of lands confiscated, occu-
pied, or otherwise taken without free and informed consent, with the 
option of providing just and fair compensation wherever such return is 
not possible.32 Despite this broad grant of sovereignty over ancestral 
lands, indigenous peoples cannot rely on the Declaration to change the 
way governments view their rights because the Declaration lacks an en-
forcement device and is therefore a mere statement of principle.33 
II. The Evolution of Indian Law and Policy in the United States 
The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards Indians; their land 
and property shall never be taken from them without their consent. 
—The Northwest Ordinance of 178734 
 Both globally and domestically, the arrival of colonists fundamen-
tally changed the relationship of indigenous peoples to one another 
and to their land.35 The arrival of white settlers in the New World 
changed life dramatically for American Indians, especially in regards to 
land rights.36 The colonists viewed land as a commodity, and ownership 
of land included permanent rights of usage (or non-usage) and the 
right to profit from its fruits.37 On the other hand, American Indians 
viewed the land as a resource, “which could not in itself be owned any 
more than could the air or the sea.”38 In tribal culture, people owned 
the right to use the land for a particular purpose, and these rights were 
vested in kin groups or villages rather than in individuals.39 These con-
flicting views of land ownership led Europeans to view American Indi-
ans as mere occupants of the land, which was ready for acquisition by 
“productive people.”40 It was nevertheless in the colonists’ interest to 
                                                                                                                      
31 See id. 
32 See id. at art. 28. 
33 See Ellen L. Lutz, Response to Romeo Saganash, “Indigenous Peoples and International, 
Human Rights,” in Land Rights, supra note 1, at 69, 71 (“[D]eclarations are not treaties, 
and they are not offered to states to ratify and thereby bind themselves as a matter of in-
ternational law. Nor do they create new enforcement machinery to which victims can turn 
if their rights are violated.”). 
34 Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50. 
35 See Richter, supra note 26, at 54. 
36 See id. 
37 Frank Pommersheim, Broken Landscape 14 (2009); Richter, supra note 26, at 54; 
John H. Vinzant, The Supreme Court’s Role in American Indian Policy 39 (2009). 
38 Richter, supra note 26, at 54. 
39 Id. 
40 Pommersheim, supra note 37, at 17. In 1810, Justice John Marshall stated: 
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keep the peace with the militarily powerful tribes on the East coast for 
purposes of trade, land, and protection, and colonists and the early 
government signed treaties to this effect with tribes.41 After hostilities 
between states and the tribes within their borders became problematic, 
the framers made relations with tribes the exclusive province of the 
federal government, and Congress passed multiple laws assuring tribes 
that they had nothing to fear.42 
 Despite this early brokered peace, subsequent federal policy to-
wards American Indian tribes has been marked by various policies of 
removal, allotment and termination.43 The tribal practice of holding 
                                                                                                                      
What is the Indian title? It is a mere occupancy for the purposes of hunting. It 
is not like our tenures; they have no idea of a title to the soil itself. It is over-
run by them, rather than inhabited. It is not a true and legal possession. It is a 
right not to be transferred but to be extinguished. 
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 121 (1810) (citations omitted). But see Stuart 
Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on the Frontier 150–51 
(2005) (arguing that the English thought the American Indians owned the land, a view 
which persisted until the 1820s when colonists viewed the tribes as occupying land owned 
by the United States). 
41 See Pevar, supra note 6, at 6 (characterizing early federal policy towards tribes as 
conciliatory, meant to avoid further hostilities after war with England, despite the fact that 
these laws were rarely enforced against settlers); Vinzant, supra note 37, at 42–45 (high-
lighting the market forces of the fur trade, government disdain for private land deals be-
tween colonists and settlers, and the desire for peace with tribes as the controlling factors 
in relations between tribes and the government). 
42 See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To regu-
late Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes . . . .”); Trade and Intercourse Act, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 (1790) (prohibiting whites 
from obtaining Indian land without government consent, restricting trade with Indians 
except in compliance with federal standards, authorized the prosecution of whites who 
committed crimes against Indians). According to Vinzant, this implies a consensual, not 
dominant, relationship with tribes designed to protect tribes from the states. Vinzant, 
supra note 37, at 46–47. 
43 See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2006) (“No Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the 
United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or 
power with whom the United States may contract by treaty.”); Act of May 29, 1830, ch. 148, 
4 Stat. 411. The policy of removal was followed by the policy of allotment under the Gen-
eral Allotment Act, which was motivated to end federal dealings with tribes and to force 
individuals to assimilate into white society. Nicole C. Salamander, Half a Full Circle: The 
Reserved Rights Doctrine and Tribal Reacquired Lands, 12 U. Denv. Water L. Rev. 333, 336, 
339 (2009); see Dawes Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 331–381 (2006). Under the termination policy, 
tribes’ relationship with and benefits from the federal government were ended abruptly, 
leaving tribes without any resources. See Pevar, supra note 6, at 11; Vinzant, supra note 37, 
at 61. In assessing tribal readiness for termination, tribes were divided into groups based 
on several criteria such as percentage of members with European ancestry, literacy rate, 
business knowledge, acceptance of white institutions, and acceptance by neighboring 
white communities. Vinzant, supra note 37, at 60. Congress began termination in 1954, 
and by the early 1960s, had terminated federal relationships with 109 tribes. Id. at 61. A 
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land in common stood as an impediment to the federal goal of “civiliz-
ing” American Indians once they had been removed to reservations in 
the west.44 As Senator Henry Dawes said of collective land ownership: 
[T]he defect of the system [is] apparent. They have got as far 
as they can go, because they own their land in common . . . 
there is no enterprise to make your home any better than that 
of your neighbors. There is no selfishness, which is at the bot-
tom of civilization. Till this people consent to give up their 
lands . . . so that each can own the land he cultivates, they will 
not make much more progress.45 
The General Allotment Act, also known as the Dawes Act, was spon-
sored by Senator Dawes and “forced the division of the tribal domain 
amongst the individual citizens of the tribe to be held by the United 
States ‘in trust’ for the individual allottee, and thereby created a ficti-
tious ‘surplus’ of tribal land that the tribe could be forced to sell.”46 Al-
though some members of Congress saw the Dawes Act as a land-grab 
that would benefit land speculators and not tribe members, this opposi-
tion did not impede the passage of the Act.47 The consequences of the 
                                                                                                                      
“terminated” tribe lost the protection of any trust relationship with the federal govern-
ment and gave the state in which the tribal lands sat civil and criminal jurisdiction over 
tribe members. Id. When it became clear that termination caused grave social, economic 
and health problems on reservations, which would require even more federal money to 
fix, Congress abandoned termination in the early 1960s in favor of a policy emphasizing 
self-determination and a return to the idealistic views of the New Deal era. See Pevar, supra 
note 6, at 12–13; Vinzant, supra note 37, at 61–62 (discussing the Menominee of Wiscon-
sin and noting particularly that the federal government spent $162,000 in 1962 on the 
tribe and another two million dollars in 1972 to fix the effects of termination). 
44 Sharon O’Brien, American Indian Tribal Governments 77 (1993). 
45 Id. 
46 G. William Rice, The Indian Reorganization Act, the Declaration on the Rights of Indige-
nous Peoples, and a Proposed Carcieri “Fix”: Updating the Trust Land Acquisition Process, 45 
Idaho L. Rev. 575, 576 (2009); see Pevar, supra note 6, at 8. Several American Indian 
rights groups, largely composed of non-Indians, supported the enactment of the Dawes 
Act because they believed that the tribes’ only hope for continued existence was to aban-
don collective ownership of land and to substitute white “civilization” for their traditional 
customs. Pommersheim, supra note 37, at 126. In addition to these self-proclaimed friends, 
land speculators also supported passage of the Dawes Act, which would free up land for 
purchase, sale and profit. Id. at 127. 
47 Pommersheim, supra note 37, at 127–28. Regarding the Dawes Act, Senator Henry 
M. Teller from Colorado said: 
If I stand alone in the Senate, I want to put upon the record my prophecy in 
this matter, that when 30 or 40 years shall have passed and these Indians shall 
have parted with their title, they will curse the hand that was raised pro-
fessedly in their defense to secure this kind of legislation . . . . 
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Dawes Act on tribes across the country were devastating and persist to 
the present.48 
 One of the few pieces of legislation passed that positively impacted 
tribal land rights was the Wheeler-Howard Indian Reorganization Act; 
it was passed in 1934 with the goals of increasing tribal landholdings 
and providing statutory authority for tribal home rule.49 Congress en-
acted the IRA with the “overriding purpose of . . . establish[ing] ma-
chinery whereby Indian tribes would be able to assume a greater de-
gree of self-government, both politically and economically.”50 Under 
the IRA, tribes “under federal jurisdiction” could claim a multitude of 
benefits, including the ability to petition the Secretary of the Interior 
(the Secretary) to take land into trust on their behalf (the trust land 
provision).51 The trust land provision allows tribes to exercise near–
                                                                                                                      
Lands in Severalty to Indians: Hearing before the H. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 46th Cong. 783 
(1881) (statement of Sen. Teller). 
48 See Rice, supra note 46, at 577. Before the passage of the Dawes Act, tribes held 138 
million acres of land nationwide but by 1934, tribal landholdings had decreased to 48 mil-
lion acres, nearly half of which were desert or semi-desert. See id. Moreover, the Dawes Act 
resulted in fractionated ownership among tribal members, increasing the administrative 
costs associated with land management to the detriment of beneficial programs and ser-
vices. See Vinzant, supra note 37, at 53–54; Rice, supra note 46, at 578. In fact, the Supreme 
Court has discussed the impoverished condition of American Indian tribes as giving rise to 
a Congressional duty to protect and to care for tribes, and that a broad grant of legislative 
power was necessary in order for Congress to carry out these duties. See Miller, supra note 
7, at 165. 
49 See 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–479; Rice, supra note 46, at 578–80. Other provisions of the IRA 
also further this purpose. See 25 U.S.C. § 461 (“[N]o land of any Indian reservation, cre-
ated or set apart by treaty or agreement with the Indians, Act of Congress, Executive order, 
purchase, or otherwise, shall be allotted in severalty to any Indian.”); id. § 462 (“The exist-
ing periods of trust placed upon any Indian lands and any restriction on alienation thereof 
are extended and continued until otherwise directed by Congress.”); id. § 463 (the Secre-
tary of the Interior may “restore to tribal ownership” any “surplus” land that had not yet 
passed into private hands); id. § 476 (tribes may “prevent the sale, disposition, lease, or 
encumbrance of tribal lands, interests in lands, or other tribal assets without the consent of 
the tribe”). 
50 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 542 (1974). 
51 25 U.S.C. § 465 (allowing the Secretary to “acquire . . . lands . . . for the purpose of 
providing land to Indians.”). Section 479 defines the term “Indian” as: 
[A]ll persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian 
tribe now under Federal jurisdiction, and all persons who are descendants of 
such members who were, on June 1, 1934, residing within the present 
boundaries of any Indian reservation, and shall further include all other per-
sons of one-half or more Indian blood. 
Id. § 479. Section 479 defines the term “tribe” as “any Indian tribe, organized band, 
pueblo, of the Indians residing on one reservation.” Id. The IRA also prohibited further 
allotment of tribal land. Id. § 461. It authorized the Secretary of the Interior to add land to 
reservations, to create new reservations for tribes that had lost all of their land, and to 
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sovereignty over their land, free from state and local taxation, regula-
tions, and civil and criminal jurisdiction.52 
 The Supreme Court has played a central role in shaping the prin-
ciples of Indian law and exercises an unusual degree of power in chang-
ing it at will.53 Although the Supreme Court has never viewed tribal 
governments as equal to our own or as worthy of deference, the its early 
principles of Indian law at least begrudgingly recognize a duty towards 
American Indians and tribes.54 These include holdings that “statutes 
are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous 
provisions interpreted to their benefit,” that tribes are “distinct, inde-
pendent political communities,” and that federal law and Indian trea-
ties preempt the laws of the state in which the tribal land sits.55 The re-
lationship between the federal governments and the tribes was 
originally likened to that between a guardian and his ward, and subse-
quently has been described as a trustee–beneficiary relationship.56 Even 
the language of the IRA itself imposes such a relationship.57 
                                                                                                                      
restore to tribal ownership any lands declared “surplus” under the Dawes Act that were still 
held by the federal government. Id. §§ 463, 465. It also established a twenty-million dollar 
credit fund from which loans could be made to incorporated tribes. Id. § 470. 
52 Pevar, supra note 6, at 98. 
53 See Fletcher, supra note 7, at 585 (“Nothing stops the court—no constitutional provi-
sion, common law principle, or anything else—from working radical transformations of 
federal Indian law at any moment.”). For an extensive history of Indian law and the Su-
preme Court, see generally David E. Wilkins, American Indian Sovereignty and the 
U.S. Supreme Court: The Masking of Justice 1–310 (1997). Wilkins argues that “‘the 
law’ as developed, articulated, and manipulated by the High Court has actually contrib-
uted to the diminution of the sovereign status of tribes and has placed tribes and their 
citizens/members in a virtually destabilized state.” Id. at viii. 
54 See Charles F. Wilkinson, American Indians, Time, and the Law 24 (1987). 
Many of the critical foundations of Indian law originated with the Supreme Court’s deci-
sions in three cases that have come to be known as the Marshall Trilogy. See Worcester v. 
Georgia, 31 U.S.(6 Pet.) 515, 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 1 
(1831); Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 543 (1823); Wilkinson, supra, at 54; 
Fletcher, supra note 7, at 592–96. 
55 See Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 767–68 (1985); Worcester, 36 U.S. (6 
Pet.) at 557–58, 561. 
56 See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 2 (“[American Indian] relations to the United States 
resemble that of a ward to his guardian. They look to our government for protection; rely 
upon its kindness and its power; appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the 
President as their great father.”); Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 
439, 444 (1988) (citing the existence of governmental “trust responsibilities” to protect 
water and fishing rights reserved to the Hoopa Valley Indians). 
57 See 25 U.S.C. § 465 (“Title to any lands acquired pursuant to this Act . . . shall be 
taken in the name of the United States in trust for the Indian tribe or individual Indian for 
which the land is acquired.”) (emphasis added). 
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 The application of the protective principles enunciated in early 
Court decisions has decreased over time.58 Between 1832 and 1959, the 
Court hardly announced any federal Indian law, and often cited to the 
political question doctrine when an Indian law question arose.59 From 
1959 until 1986, tribal interests won victories before the Supreme Court 
in approximately sixty percent of cases.60 Prior to becoming Chief, Jus-
tice William Rehnquist played a prominent role in the losses sustained 
by tribal interests during this period.61 Once Justice Rehnquist became 
the Chief Justice in 1986, the rate of tribal success dropped below 
twenty-five percent.62 The Rehnquist Court reversed presumptions that 
tribes were not subject to state taxation, limited tribal criminal and civil 
jurisdiction over nonmembers, and limited both the federal trust re-
sponsibility toward Indian tribes and the canons of construing Indian 
treaties and statutes to the benefit of Indians and tribes.63 Though 
Chief Justice Rehnquist no longer sits on the Court, his Court’s legacy 
is apparent in decisions like Carcieri.64 
III. Carcieri v. Salazar as an Example of the Supreme Court’s 
Refusal to Recognize Collective Rights to Land 
 In Carcieri, the Supreme Court divested the Narragansett tribe of 
benefits under the IRA, including trust land benefits.65 The majority’s 
holding, that the Secretary’s authority under the IRA to “provid[e] 
land for Indians” extended only to tribes that obtained federal recogni-
                                                                                                                      
58 See Fletcher, supra note 7, at 597. 
59 Id. at 598. 
60 Id. at 598–99 (citing Alex Tallcheif Skibine, Teaching Indian Law in an Anti-Tribal Era, 
82 N.D. L. Rev. 777, 779–80) (2006)). 
61 Id. at 599 (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Washington v. Con-
federated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980); Oliphant v. Suqu-
amish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978)). 
62 David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court’s Pursuit of States’ Rights, 
Color-Blind Justice, and Mainstream Values, 86 Minn. L. Rev. 267, 280–81 (2001). In contrast, 
convicted criminals achieved reversal in thirty-six percent of cases that reached the Su-
preme Court in the same period. Id. 
63 United States v. Cherokee Nation, 480 U.S. 700, 707–08 (1987) (limiting trust re-
sponsibility); Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 128 (1983) (limiting trust responsibil-
ity); Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 205–06 (no criminal jurisdiction over non-tribal members); 
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 587–88 (1977) (limiting practice of constru-
ing treaties and statutes to the benefit of tribes); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai 
Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 483 (1976) (subjecting tribes to state 
taxation). 
64 See Carcieri v. Salazar (Carcieri III ), 129 S. Ct. 1058, 1068 (2009) (removing benefits 
from tribes); Getches, supra note 62, 280–81. 
65 Carcieri v. Salazar (Carcieri III ), 129 S. Ct. 1058, 1068 (2009). 
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tion before 1934, spoke more to the individualized notions of land 
ownership present in the Dawes Act than to the revitalization policy 
behind the IRA.66 Because the IRA was passed, in part, to return some 
of the collective benefits tribes had lost during centuries of assimilation, 
allocation and termination, the Court’s decision was at odds with the 
spirit of the IRA.67 
 Formerly one of the most powerful tribes in New England, the 
Narragansett tribe of Rhode Island began to lose its land and its sover-
eignty when settlers came to Rhode Island in large numbers.68 In 1675, 
the Narragansett Tribe attempted to defend its independence and 
autonomy in King Philip’s War, but it was defeated by the colonists.69 In 
1880, “Rhode Island passed a ‘detribalization’ law that abolished tribal 
authority, ended the State’s guardianship of the Tribe, and attempted 
to sell all tribal lands.”70 The Tribe initially agreed to cede all but two 
acres of its ancestral lands to the State in exchange for $5000.71 
 The Tribe regretted its decision almost immediately, and began an 
epic campaign to regain control of its ancestral lands.72 One important 
step towards regaining sovereignty occurred in 1983 when the Tribe 
obtained federal recognition as an Indian Tribe, allowing it to seek “the 
protection, services, and benefits of the federal government,” including 
                                                                                                                      
66 See id. at 1067–68. 
67 See id. at 1067. 
68 See Bryan J. Nowlin, Conflicts in Sovereignty: The Narragansett Tribe in Rhode Island, 30 
Am. Ind. L. Rev. 151, 151 (2005–2006). 
69 See Kawashima, supra note 68, at 139–143. 
70 Carcieri III, 129 S. Ct. at 1072 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
71 See id. at 1061 (majority opinion). Although Roger Williams’ purchase was amicable, 
as the colonist population in Rhode Island grew, tensions between the colonists and the 
Tribe increased, culminating in 1675 and 1676 in King Philip’s war which saw the Tribe 
defeated at the hands of the colonists. See id.; Yasuhide Kawashima, Igniting King 
Philip’s War 131–43 (2001); Nowlin, supra, at 151 
72 Carcieri III, 129 S. Ct. at 1073. The Tribe claimed that the sale was invalid because it 
violated the Indian Non-Intercourse Act of June 30, 1830. Id. at 1073 n.3. In 1975, the 
Tribe initiated two lawsuits in the Federal District Court of Rhode Island, to regain title to 
3200 acres of ancestral land in Charlestown, Rhode Island. Narragansett Tribe of Indians v. 
Murphy, 426 F. Supp. 132 (D.R.I. 1976); Narragansett Tribe of Indians v. S.R.I. Land Dev. 
Corp., 418 F. Supp. 798 (D.R.I. 1976). The parties settled the pending litigation by enter-
ing into a Joint Memorandum of Understanding, which provided for the Tribe’s acquisi-
tion of 1800 acres of land in Charlestown (“the settlement lands”), held in trust for the 
benefit of the tribe by a state-chartered entity, The Narragansett Indian Land Management 
Corporation. Carcieri v. Norton (Carcieri I ), 290 F. Supp. 2d 167, 170 (D.R.I. 2003), aff’d 
sub nom. Carcieri v. Kempthorne (Carcieri II ), 497 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. 
Carcieri III, 129 S. Ct. 1058 (2009). In exchange for the settlement lands, the Tribe agreed 
to the enactment of federal legislation that eliminated all Narragansett land claims in 
Rhode Island. See Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1716 
(2006); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 37–18–1 to 37–18–15 (2006). 
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(so it believed) those benefits available under the IRA.73 Shortly there-
after, the Tribe made plans to build low-income housing for its mem-
bers on a thirty-one acre parcel (“the parcel”) that it had purchased in 
1991.74 When the Tribe began construction, however, the State sought 
injunctive relief prohibiting the Tribe from continuing without first 
obtaining state and/or local permits.75 The Tribe contended that per-
mits were not required because the development would be on tribal 
land, therefore precluding state jurisdiction.76 The First Circuit Court 
of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s decision in favor of the state 
and ordered an injunction prohibiting the tribe from occupying the 
lands until they complied with Charlestown’s permitting process.77 
 To resolve the conflict and to escape potential regulations and ex-
actions on the parcel, the Tribe petitioned the Secretary to take the 
parcel into trust on its behalf pursuant to the Secretary’s authority un-
der the IRA.78 The Secretary consented and the Board of Indian Affairs 
(BIA) notified the town of Charlestown and the State of Rhode Island 
of the Secretary’s intention to take the parcel into trust.79 The State, 
town, and governor appealed the decision to the Interior Board of In-
dian Appeals (IBIA), which affirmed that the Secretary could take the 
parcel into trust for the benefit of the tribe.80 
 Governor Donald L. Carcieri, the State, and the town petitioned 
for review of the Secretary’s decision in U.S. District Court for the Dis-
                                                                                                                      
73 Carcieri III, 129 S.Ct at 1062; see Final Determination for Federal Acknowlegment of 
Narragansett Indian Tribe of Rhode Island, 48 Fed. Reg. 6177–05 (Feb. 10, 1983). In 
granting federal recognition, the Bureau of Indian Affairs stated that the Tribe and its 
predecessors had a documented history stretching back to 1614 and that essentially every 
member of the Tribe could trace at least one ancestor back to the “detribalization” in 
1880. 48 Fed. Reg. 6177–05. 
74 Carcieri I, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 170. 
75 Id. at 171; see Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 878 F. Supp. 349 
(D.R.I. 1995), rev’d in part, aff’d in part, 89 F.3d 908 (1st Cir. 1996). It appears that the State 
was less concerned about low-income housing and more concerned that if the Tribe were 
able to build anything it wanted without first gaining State and local approval, the Tribe 
could build a gaming facility. See Nowlin, supra note 68, at 155. Because the State of Rhode 
Island did not want gaming within its borders, it responded fiercely to the Tribe’s con-
struction of low-income housing on the parcel. See id. There has been a backlash regarding 
the “special” rights that American Indians have, especially those related to gaming. See 
Jeffrey R. Dudas, The Cultivation of Resentment: Treaty Rights and the New 
Right 7–11, 98–112 (2008). 
76 See Narragansett Elec. Co., 878 F. Supp. at 354. 
77 See Carcieri I, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 171. 
78 See id. at 171–72. 
79 See id. at 172. 
80 See Carcieri II, 497 F.3d at 24. 
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trict of Rhode Island.81 The court held that § 479 of the IRA defined 
“Indian” to include members of all tribes in existence in 1934 but did 
not require tribes to be federally recognized at that time.82 The court 
held that because the Narragansett Tribe existed in 1934 and subse-
quently obtained federal recognition, the Secretary was authorized to 
take land into trust on its behalf.83 The First Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed, stating that because the word “now” was ambiguous, it would 
defer to the Secretary’s construction of the provision.84 
 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and Justice 
Clarence Thomas, writing for the majority, reversed the decisions of the 
Secretary, the BIA, the IBIA, the District Court, and the First Circuit.85 
The Court held “that the term ‘now under federal jurisdiction’ in § 479 
unambiguously refer[red] to those tribes that were under the federal 
jurisdiction of the United States when the IRA was enacted in 1934[,]” 
which limited the Secretary’s authority under § 465 to members of 
tribes that were under federal jurisdiction at that time.86 Because the 
Narragansett Tribe was not under federal jurisdiction in 1934, the Sec-
retary could not take land into trust on its behalf.87 
                                                                                                                      
81 Carcieri I, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 169. 
82 Id. at 179. 
83 Id. at 181. 
84 Carcieri II, 497 F.3d at 26, 30. Two First Circuit Judges wrote dissenting opinions that 
hinted at what was to come. See id. at 48–51 (Howard, J., dissenting); id. at 51–52 (Selya, J., 
dissenting). Judge Jeffrey R. Howard asserted that the effect of the Rhode Island Indian 
Claims Settlement Act was to extinguish simultaneously all future claims raised by “Indians 
qua Indians” and to bring the Tribe under the civil and criminal jurisdiction of Rhode 
Island. Id. at 48–49 (Howard, J., dissenting). Moreover, Judge Howard noted, the parcel 
was within the land area the Tribe had claimed in 1975 and the Tribe was therefore es-
topped from invoking the benefits of the IRA with respect to it. Id. at 49. Judge Bruce Mar-
shall Selya, in a separate dissent, concluded that “the Tribe’s surrender of its right to an 
autonomous enclave, and the waiver of much of its sovereign immunity suggest[ed] with 
unmistakable clarity that the parties intended to . . . preserve[ ] the State’s civil, criminal, 
and regulatory jurisdiction over any and all lands within its borders.” Id. at 51 (Selya, J., 
dissenting) (citation omitted). Judge Selya went on to assert that “[w]hile ‘hope’ is the 
official motto of Rhode Island, the State should not be force-fed hope in place of rights for 
which it has bargained.” Id. at 51–52. 
85 Carcieri III, 129 S. Ct. at 1068. 
86 Id. 
87 See id. Justice Thomas noted that none of the parties or amici, including the Tribe, ar-
gued that the Tribe was under federal jurisdiction in 1934. Id. Justice Stephen Breyer, how-
ever, cited examples of retroactive federal recognition and extension of IRA benefits to tribes 
that were in existence in 1934 but not yet federally recognized. See id. at 1069–70 (Breyer J., 
concurring). Justice David Souter suggested that the respondents did not pursue this line of 
reasoning because the Secretary believed that after the Tribe obtained Federal recognition in 
1983, it was eligible for IRA benefits. See id. at 1071 (Souter, J., dissenting). Given the Secre-
tary’s understanding of Federal recognition, Justice Souter recommended remanding the 
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 Although the majority listed each of the Secretary’s arguments it 
disagreed with, three particular arguments in the holding deserve atten-
tion.88 First, the majority rejected the Secretary’s argument that the 
word “now” in § 479 was, in fact, ambiguous.89 Second, they rejected the 
Secretary’s argument that Congress’ intent in passing the IRA was to 
benefit tribal communities regardless of their status in 1934, and that 
the ambiguity in the word “now” should therefore be interpreted in fa-
vor of the Tribe.90 Instead, the Court held that “Congress’ use of the 
word ‘now’ in § 479 speaks for itself,” and therefore the Court did not 
need to consider policy at all.91 Third, the majority rejected the Secre-
tary’s argument that the definition of “Indian” in § 479 was rendered 
irrelevant by the broader definition of “tribe” in § 479 and by the fact 
that § 465 authorized the Secretary to take title to lands “in the name of 
the United States in trust for the Indian tribe or individual Indian for 
which the land is acquired.”92 They asserted that because the § 479 defi-
nition of “tribe” referred to “any Indian tribe,” the temporal restrictions 
that applied to the word “Indian” also applied to the word “tribe.”93 
 The majority’s conclusions that the definitions in § 479 are unam-
biguous and do not include the Narragansett tribe are erroneous.94 In 
fact, Justice Stephen Breyer, in his concurrence, noted that although 
the phrase “now under federal jurisdiction” could refer to a tribe’s ju-
risdictional status as of 1934, it could also refer to the time the Secre-
                                                                                                                      
case to give the respondents the chance to argue that the Tribe was under federal jurisdiction 
in 1934. Id. 
88 Id. at 1063–68 (majority opinion). 
89 Id. at 1063–66 (citing the definition of “now,” use of “now” in the rest of the IRA, the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs’ interpretation of the provision in 1934, and the lack of 
room to add beneficiaries to the statute despite use of the word “include” in the introduc-
tory clause of § 479). 
90 Carcieri III, 129 S. Ct. at 1066. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 1067 (quoting 25 U.S.C. §§ 465, 479 (2006)). 
93 Id. (“But the definition of ‘tribe’ in § 479 itself refers to ‘any Indian tribe’ . . . and 
therefore is limited by the temporal restrictions that apply to § 479’s definition of ‘In-
dian.’” (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 479 (emphasis added))). 
94 See, e.g., id. at 1064, 1066 (discussing unambiguous nature of word “now”); id. at 
1066 (refusing to consider policy views because the statute is unambiguous); id. at 1067 n.7 
(refusing to consider petitioner’s alternative arguments because the statutory language is 
unambiguous); id. at 1073. Moreover, there are sections of the IRA in which Congress used 
the term “Indians” and “Indian tribe” interchangeably, indicating that Congress was not as 
concerned with semantic clarity as the majority opinion suggests. See id. at 1073 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting). Justice John Paul Stevens discusses § 475 as an example: §  475 refers to 
“‘any claim or suit of any Indian tribe’ in the first sentence and ‘any claim of such Indians 
against the United States’ in the last sentence.’” Id. at 1076 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 475 (em-
phasis added)). 
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tary exercises his trust authority.95 Justice John Paul Stevens, in his dis-
sent, asserted that “[w]ithout the benefit of context, a reasonable per-
son could conclude that ‘Indians’ refers to multiple individuals who 
each qualify as ‘Indian’ under the IRA. An equally reasonable person 
could also conclude that ‘Indians’ is meant to refer to a collective, 
namely, an Indian tribe.”96 Even if the phrase “now under federal juris-
diction” is as unambiguous as the majority suggests, the rest of § 479 
clearly extends benefits to the Tribe.97 
 Although the majority overlays the temporal restrictions of “In-
dian” onto the definition of “tribe,” the IRA does not support this con-
struction.98 The original IRA provided that the trust land provision ap-
plied only to tribes and not to individuals at all.99 A plain reading of 
§ 465 supports the conclusion that there are individual beneficiaries of 
the IRA— “individual Indians” —as well as collective beneficiaries— 
“Indian tribes.”100 “The [IRA’s] language could not be clearer,” stated 
Justice Stevens, observing that “[t]o effectuate the Act’s broad mandate 
to revitalize tribal development and cultural self-determination, the 
Secretary can take land into trust for a tribe or he can take land into 
trust for an individual Indian.”101 Additionally, though the benefits 
available to individual “Indians” appear to be temporally limited in 
§ 479, tribes do not appear to be similarly limited.102 Justice Stevens 
noted that “[f]ederal recognition, regardless of when it is conferred, is 
the necessary condition that triggers a tribe’s eligibility to receive trust 
land” and not, as the majority holds, the 1934 date of the IRA’s enact-
                                                                                                                      
95 Carcieri III, 129 S. Ct. at 1068–69 (Breyer, J., concurring). Compare Difford v. Secre-
tary of HHS, 910 F.2d 1316, 1320 (1990) (“now” refers to time of exercise of delegated 
authority), with Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 311–312 (1960) (“now” refers to time 
of statutory enactment). 
96 Carcieri III, 129 S. Ct. at 1076 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
97 Id. at 1072. 
98 See id. at 1072. 
99 See id. at 1074 (comparing the proposed language of the IRA, which read “[t]itle to 
any land acquired pursuant to the provisions of this section shall be taken in the name of 
the United States in trust for the Indian tribe or community for whom the land is acquired” with 
§ 465, which states that “[t]itle to any lands or rights pursuant to this Act . . . shall be taken 
in the name of the United States in trust for the Indian tribe or individual Indian for which the 
land was acquired” (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2006); H.R. 7902, 73d Cong. (1934)(emphasis 
added in both extracts))). 
100 25 U.S.C. § 465; Carcieri III, 129 S. Ct. at 1073. 
101 See Carcieri III, 129 S. Ct. at 1073. 
102 See 25 U.S.C. § 479 (“The term “tribe” wherever used in this Act shall be construed 
to refer to any Indian tribe, organized band, pueblo, or the Indians residing on one reser-
vation.”). 
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ment.103 Because no party to the litigation disputed that the Tribe was 
federally recognized at the time it requested that the Secretary take the 
parcel into trust, the Secretary lawfully exercised his authority.104 
 The majority’s myopic focus on the individual at the expense of 
the collective serves not only to deny the Tribe benefits under the IRA, 
but also makes a clear statement that the Court does not respect the 
collective rights of tribes.105 Though the word “tribe” may be defined 
with reference to the word “Indian,” as the majority asserts, the word 
“Indian” is just as inextricably linked to the word “tribe.”106 In a collec-
tive society that historically did not recognize individual rights to land, 
an individual was first and foremost a member of a collective.107 The 
majority’s holding that only individuals may claim rights to land denies 
that, historically, American Indians had a collective view of ownership 
and imposes a colonial, individualized concept of land ownership onto 
tribes, to their detriment.108 
 Even a superficial look into the policy behind the IRA shows that it 
was the most influential part of the “Indian New Deal” of 1934, which 
Congress intended to restore tribal collective rights to land.109 Congress 
adopted the IRA with the recognition that tribes were a permanent part 
of the American landscape and that tribes’ continued existence de-
pended on encouragement from the federal government to self-govern 
and to progress collectively as peoples.110 Congress intended the IRA to 
be “sweeping in scope” which would seem to include all of the nation’s 
tribes, and would certainly not exclude those who had obtained federal 
                                                                                                                      
103 Carcieri III, 129 S. Ct. at 1075 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
104 Id. 
105 See id. at 1067 (majority opinion). The majority asserts that there is no way to define 
“tribe” without reference to the definition of “Indian.” See id. The implication is that a tribe 
has no additional or special meaning beyond its status as a collection of individuals. See id. 
106 See id. at 1077 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
107 See Richter, supra note 26, at 54. 
108 See Carcieri III, 129 S. Ct. at 1067. 
109 See id. at 1073 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting); e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 477 (2006) (authorizing 
the Secretary to grant tribes the authority to acquire, manage, and dispose of lands and 
other property). 
110 See Rice, supra note 46, at 580. This is in contrast to the assumption driving the 
Dawes Act, namely that tribes would eventually disappear and that the federal government 
needed to make provisions for individual Indians to prepare them for “American” (that is, 
white American) society. See Matthew Atkinson, Red Tape: How American Laws Ensnare Native 
American Lands, Resources, and People, 23 Okla. City. U. L. Rev. 379, 396 (1998) (“Nobody 
thought the Indians would survive very long so no provisions were made for long-term 
inheritance.”); Salamander, supra note 43, at 339. 
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recognition.111 The majority’s decision to narrow the purview of the IRA 
defeats the sweeping intent of Congress and serves to deny the Narra-
gansett and many other tribes the benefits meant to ensure their collec-
tive rights to land, to self-determination, and to basic existence.112 
 Not only did the majority refuse to look at the policy behind the 
IRA, it also refused to consider the foundational principles of Indian 
law, which would have given the Secretary and the Tribe a greater 
chance of success.113 The Court did not abide by or even discuss the 
principles that, first, Indian treaties must be interpreted as tribal mem-
bers would have understood them and second, that “statutes are to be 
construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions 
interpreted to their benefit.”114 If the Narragansett Tribe believed that 
federal recognition would allow them to seek benefits under the IRA, 
the majority needed to defer to this belief. 115 
 More importantly, the federal government owes American Indian 
tribes a fiduciary duty, which obligates the Court to act in the best in-
terests of the Tribe.116 Though the trustee-beneficiary relationship is 
predicated on the troublesome view that American Indians are too 
weak to act in their own best interests, the duty remains.117 In Carcieri, 
the Court breached its fiduciary duty by unilaterally removing IRA 
benefits from the Narragansett and from many other tribes through 
strict construction of a statute that was meant to be sweeping and bene-
ficial in nature.118 If the intent behind the IRA was to redress the 
wrongs perpetrated against tribes and their members, the Court must, 
as a fiduciary, extend the benefits under the IRA to those tribes who 
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414 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 30:395 
have been wronged.119 The Narragansett Tribe, once powerful in New 
England, has been reduced to mere tenant on its land by centuries of 
war and difficult relations with the State.120 The Tribe has been a victim 
of a multitude of wrongs and is therefore entitled to whatever benefits 
the IRA offers, benefits which a loyal fiduciary would not withhold.121 
IV. Moving Forward: Recognizing Collective Tribal Rights 
 In response to the Court’s decision in Carcieri, Congress has taken 
corrective action.122 On September 24, 2009 a bill was introduced in the 
Senate to strike from § 479 the phrase “any recognized Indian tribe now 
under federal jurisdiction” and to replace it with “any federally recog-
nized Indian tribe.”123 The bill also amends the definition of “tribe” to 
read “any Indian . . . tribe . . . that the Secretary of the Interior acknowl-
edges to exist as an Indian tribe.”124 The same bill was introduced in the 
House of Representatives on October 1, 2009.125 This amendment to 
the IRA, if it becomes effective, will reverse the Court’s holding in Carci-
eri that the IRA only applies to tribes recognized in 1934 and instead, 
will extend benefits to any federally recognized tribe.126 
 Although the United States has expressed concern that recogniz-
ing collective rights will lead to the oppression of individuals within 
those collectives, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of In-
digenous Peoples provides a model for recognizing the collective with-
out sacrificing the individual.127 Recognizing the collective rights of 
American Indians within the framework provided by the Declaration 
would restore the Court’s position as a trustee acting in the best inter-
ests of tribes.128 In the midst of the international debate on the collec-
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tive rights of indigenous peoples, the Court could provide a model for 
the rest of the world to follow as the global community begins the long 
task of restoring indigenous rights to land. 
Conclusion 
 Among indigenous peoples worldwide, the collective right to own 
and inhabit land is tantamount to survival, and yet, indigenous peoples 
across the globe face challenges to retaining or regaining their ances-
tral homelands. For centuries, the U.S. government and its colonial 
predecessors removed tribes from land and took land from tribes, con-
sistently refusing to recognize collective rights to land. In Carcieri v. Sa-
lazar, the U.S. Supreme Court continued this longstanding tradition by 
withholding collective land rights from the Narraganset Tribe. Despite 
Congressional action to reverse the effects of the Court’s decision, the 
damage has already been wrought for the Narragansett Tribe’s low-
income housing development. The Court’s myopic focus on the word 
“now” made the Narragansett and many other tribes ineligible for some 
of the few benefits the federal government still offers to those who have 
suffered at its hands. 
 In the future, the Court must broaden its interpretation of statutes 
that confer benefits on tribes in order to reverse the land grabbing 
policies of the past and to restore collective tribal ownership of ances-
tral lands. The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples pro-
vides a vision statement that could effectively guide the Court as it 
remedies the devastation of the Rehnquist era and returns to the prin-
ciples behind the Indian New Deal and the fundamental canons of In-
dian law. Proceeding in this way will allow tribes to re-establish them-
selves as sovereign entities and to begin mitigating the effects of 
centuries of strife. If the Court acts as a guardian for the collective 
rights for tribes while still protecting the individual rights of tribe 
members, American Indians will be able to prosper in ways unheard of 
since the pre-colonial era. In contrast, failure to guard the collective 
rights of American Indians will ensure their continued marginalization 
and the ultimate destruction of the first inhabitants of this nation. 
                                                                                                                      
(“[American Indian] relations to the United States resemble that of a ward to his guard-
ian. They look to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its power; 
appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the President as their great father.”). 
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